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Abstract
Rwanda under the rule of President Juvenal Habyarimana and the MRND government was a de facto
totalitarian governed society, and throughout Habyarimana’s twenty-one year rule, it has been established
that there was clear propaganda and hatred directed toward those citizens identified as Tutsi through
their national identification records. This article examines the effects of centralized power harbored by
Habyarimana and the MRND during this time utilizing a theoretical framework based on the intersection
of complementary theory from Foucault, Dahl and Weber. The methodology includes a novel critical
discourse analysis (CDA) of transcribed speeches delivered by Habyarimana and Leon Mugesera, as well
as a short ethnography of the author’s own experience of visiting memorial sites in Rwanda. Conclusions
are reached that bring in analysis of Popper’s Paradox of Tolerance and argue that contrary to some
opinion on the matter, it is not unreasonable to expect a degree of restriction of free speech under a
limited set of circumstances when a society such as Rwanda’s has suffered previous mass extreme
victimization as a result of past abuse of the power-knowledge-discourse relationship.
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Words and Power in Conflict—Rwanda Under MRND Rule
Allan T. Moore
This article examines the role of power in relation to the 1994 Genocide against the
Tutsi in Rwanda. The context is initially set through a short ethnographic account of the
author’s first-hand experiences in Rwanda, then further developed in a literature review
focused on the role of propaganda as a tool to divide the Hutu and Tutsi populations in the
decades leading to 1994. The research is situated at the nexus of relationships between Hutu
and Tutsi citizens, between the Hutu National Revolutionary Movement for Development
(MRND —the sole political party in Rwanda at the time) officials and other powerful Hutu
figures, and between Hutu MRND officials and citizens. An original critical discourse
analysis of transcribed speeches made by President Juvénal Habyarimana and Leon
Mugesera, former MRND vice chairman, form the basis of the research underpinning the
article’s discussion and conclusions. In a theoretical sense, the article ascribes at least some
of the causes of conflict in the Rwandan context to centralized power-knowledge-discourse,
combining complementary aspects of theory developed by Weber, Dahl, and Foucault. This
article, therefore, through a wholly novel combination of the theoretical intersections in
question, and the original adaptation of data analysis and subsequent presentation, is intended
to make a valuable contribution to the extant body of knowledge and published work that cuts
across the themes of propaganda, identity-based conflict, hate speech, and the power of
authority figures to control large numbers of the masses through propaganda and public
discourse.
The Consequential Extent of Abuse of Power—An Ethnographic Account
Look over the lifeless body of a woman cradling her deceased baby. There they lie
still, on a wooden bedframe. Scanning around the room there are perhaps another fifty
bodies—all unnaturally whitened as a result of the powder used to preserve them and prevent
decomposition. And this is just one room. Next door there is another room, and another next
door to that. There is an identical building behind this one, and another behind that, both
containing room upon room of preserved bodies—about a thousand in all. It is a macabre
scene kept on display to remind any visitors to Murambi, in Rwanda, of what the ultimate
result of unrestrained hatred can be. That is, the genocide against the Tutsi carried out in
Rwanda in 1994. It is extremely difficult not to become emotional and feel nauseous when
faced with such alarmingly brutal reality. This is not the experience of viewing a mummy
from ancient Egypt in a museum. That baby should still be alive today. He or she would be a

mere twenty-six years of age, perhaps freshly graduating from a university or at the early
stages of a career path. Instead, he or she is forever a dead baby, killed not just by that direct
event of the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi, but also as a culmination of two decades of
presidency and government that wielded totalitarian power, that endorsed impunity for those
who engaged in hate-fuelled discussion and actions against their Tutsi neighbors, up to and
including, acts of mass murder. A powerful government looked on, knew what was
happening, and did not condemn or criticize. In fact, it encouraged it.
A Modern Humanitarian Disaster
An equally difficult moment came when visiting Nyamata church. The church was a
place where thousands of Tutsi took refuge, believing that the killers would not dare commit
killings in such a sacred place. They were wrong. When the killers advanced, those hiding
were trapped, and with a combination of machetes, guns, and grenades—aside from a few
who escaped or were hidden beneath piles of bodies—nearly all were murdered. Nyamata
now stands as a memorial site, with purpose built mass graves for the thousands of victims
that died in the surrounding region. My most extreme emotional experience emerged when
looking over the clothes of the victims piled and hung over the church pews. I came across
the section where children’s clothing was located, and at the top of the pile was a small green
jumper, decorated with cartoon characters, about the size that would fit a child of two or three
years of age. This would have come from the young child who almost certainly was killed
while wearing it. A modern child, who liked the same cartoons and shared the same cultures
that children today still enjoy. I am unashamed to say that I wept. I had a son of about the
same age at home for whom that jumper would have fit perfectly. This was not a historical
issue that we can detach ourselves from. This was a contemporary calamity, that although
many would deny it, can happen again if extremist policies and unlimited power go
unchallenged.
Rwanda—The Literature
Uvin (1999) explained that the institutionalization within public policy of positive
discrimination in favor of Hutu, combined with anti-Tutsi sentiment, were crucial elements in
the ongoing retention of absolute power by Habyarimana and his MRND Government.
Further, due to their controlled public discourse they had the power, used in practice, to
escalate or de-escalate tensions and violence at will. He explained that:
Rwanda provides an almost perfect example of the dynamics that have been discussed
by scholars of genocides: the existence of long-standing, widespread, and
institutionalized prejudice; the radicalization of animosity and routinization of
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violence; the “moral exclusion” of a category of people, allowing first their “social
death” and then their physical death. (p. 253)
Uvin discussed Rwanda’s colonial history, and in particular the ethnic identity labels
and precolonial origins of the Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa as a source of debate. Although
preference appears in the literature to point toward the caste system, there is by no means a
consensus on this point. In any case, Hintjens (2001) explained that:
As early as 1959, the evidence suggested that on average Tutsi Rwandans were no
better off than Rwandan Hutu... Unfortunately, this did nothing to counter racial
stereotypes propagated by the Belgian colonizers. Notions of racial inferiority and
superiority were adopted by Rwandans themselves (i.e., internalized) and made it very
difficult to construct a shared anti-colonial form of nationalist identity. (p. 30)
This indicates that the colonial strategy of divide and rule had been successful with the
divisions now internalized by the population and not viewed as the responsibility of the
colonizer; whether there was in fact little by way of wealth or standing for the ordinary
person becomes at least to some extent irrelevant. What is more significant in terms of realworld implication becomes the constructed self-identity of each distinct group, and consensus
within each of those groups. As Gurr (1993) argued, it “…is not the presence of a particular
trait or combination of traits, but rather the shared perception that the defining traits,
whatever they are, set the group apart” (p. 4).
As Uvin (1999) discussed, the historical power and dominance of the Tutsi at the
State level, as orchestrated by the Belgian colonists, became a proxy for how the Hutu
population also viewed the rest of the Tutsi population in the country at the time. It must be
understood that conflicts dating back to 1959 and the Hutu uprising, which immediately
preceded Rwandan independence from Belgian colonial administrators, had already caused
millions of the Rwandan population to flee to neighboring countries—mainly Uganda and
Zaire (now DRC) (Tiemessen, 2004, p. 58). In 1973 Juvénal Habyarimana took control of
Rwanda in a coup, and he would go on to rule as president for twenty-one years. In his early
years as president he was praised for not initiating divisive policies as Kayibanda had before
him. However, it quickly became clear that the key to power in Rwanda was not what was
documented in written form, but what was carried out through the country’s historical and
still present oral traditions. In terms of the role of power related to discourse through public
speaking, in an authoritarian regime such as Rwanda during Habyarimana’s rule,
Moghaddam et al. (2008) discussed that positioning can complement official roles and assist
with crystallizing expectations:
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Positioning theory concerns conventions of speech and action that are labile,
contestable and ephemeral… closely related to Goffman’s procedures by which
someone establishes a “footing” in a conversation or some other social process… This
idea can be expressed in the image of a conversation going on, with someone on the
periphery of the group wanting to have a say. How does this person get a footing in
the group and gain the right to intervene? (p. 9)
So the stronger the power over the discourse in question, the more difficult it becomes for
anybody other than a select few to establish a footing in order to publicly adopt a
contradictory position. Instead, a consistent official position on a matter becomes the norm,
and through accompanying propaganda is legitimized in the minds of the masses. Indeed
Louis (2008) corroborated this stance by outlining that one of the main goals of positioning
theory is “to identify who does and does not possess positioning power, the basis on which
the power is allocated, and the role of differences in positioning power in the conflict (e.g., in
making certain story lines more dominant)” (p. 30).
In the context of Rwanda from post-independence until the genocide in 1994, the
nature of MRND dominance as a group—and for two decades President Habyarimana’s
power as an individual—ensured that positioning power was controlled absolutely by the
State. Propaganda was supported by the President himself and through state-sponsored
organizations that used and reinforced very specific language and embarked on a planned,
long-term strategy of dehumanization of the Tutsi population of Rwanda. As a consequence
of these prior decades, as Rwanda moved into the 1990s, it was already a broken and divided
society—the members of which had been raised from birth and educated to believe that the
two main ethnic groups (Hutu and Tutsi) should not trust each other (Hilker, 2011, pp. 268272).
Baisley (2014) identified that “Rwandan elites suggested that all Tutsi—even those
inside Rwanda—were supporters of the RPF” (p. 40) and noted that between 1990 and 1994
several massacres of Tutsi populations occurred around the country. This is further detailed
by Caplan (2007), who identified eight specific massacres between October 1990 and
February 1994 that can all be linked back to individuals associated with the state and state
institutions. This is where the importance of political speeches can be asserted, as can be
explained with the references from Baisley and Caplan above to Rwandan elites and
local/national politicians being responsible for the narrative to that point. Indeed Baisley
asserted that:
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Habyarimana’s speeches drew on a past when Tutsi had been masters of Hutu
peasants… the ideology drew on a (somewhat real and somewhat imagined) past
when Hutu were poor peasants and Tutsi were wealthy masters… This ideology
manifested itself in propaganda leading up to and during the genocide… My analysis
of Radio Rwanda and RTLM broadcasts reveals that both stations exploited
constructions of Hutu and Tutsi as occupational/status groups, even if those divisions
were more imagined than material by the time of the genocide. (p. 40)
This explanation then sets the logical premise that the words and direction were first created
by the speeches, which created the ideology, and that ideology was repeated and strengthened
by the radio broadcasts. The speeches were necessary first steps from which the broadcasts
took direction. This contention is corroborated by the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda (ICTR), who in 2003 clarified in their judgment of the Nahimana case that the
overarching purpose of the various RTLM broadcasts was “where at issue is the speech of the
so-called ‘majority population,’ in support of the government” (ICTR, 2003, p. 1008).
Thus, the officially documented legal explanation is that the propaganda and hate
speech broadcast was directly linked with publicly promulgated state ideology. As such, the
importance of these speeches cannot be downplayed, rather they ought to be characterized as
being one of the root causes for the genocide against the Tutsi.
Important also as raised previously, is not just what was contained within these
speeches, but also what was missing. So while the presentation of Hutu power and
righteousness is clear, and blameworthiness of the RPF is present, what was missing is
explained by Baisley (2014) who observes that “Habyarimana’s regime did not warn people
against confusing supporters of the RPF with Tutsi as an ‘ethnic’ group. Political interest was
equated with ‘ethnic’ identity, with the RPF being considered Tutsi and vice versa” (p. 40).
This missing information as part of the narrative suited the state-constructed meaning system;
it made sense to leave the omission unaddressed, as this could allow for denial of
responsibility for resulting violent actions. Further solidifying this view on the power of the
state to control the narrative, Hintjens (2001) asserts that “in Rwanda only some forms of
hatred were deliberately nurtured; inter-Hutu rivalries were actively suppressed. Hatred was
only legitimate when directed towards a specific target, identified by the state” (p. 26).
With regard to the ultimate effect of this misused power and failure of any others with
alternative viewpoints to gain a foothold in public discourse, Romeo Dallaire (2007) explains
that when it came to neutral reporting, or that which might be critical and hold a government
to account, “In the case of Rwanda, that’s where the process broke down. The events in
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Rwanda simply did not break through to such an extent as to create momentum” (p.15). The
various analyses of public information in Rwanda at that time all point to one logical
conclusion: the totality of power and control Habyarimana and the MRND government held.
Upon Habyarimana’s sudden death in his airplane’s destruction on April 6, 1994, by
persons unknown, the result of decades of propaganda quickly became apparent. In 100 days,
a large majority of the Tutsi population living in Rwanda, as well as many moderate Hutu
who had not supported the ideological hatred perpetuated by the controlling regime, were
massacred in a swift and brutal genocide. While the number of deaths remains a contested
fact, recent evidence suggests that as mass graves have continued to be uncovered in the
intervening two decades since the initial 800,000 figure that was used, the true number may
be over one million (SURF, 2020).
Words Matter – Rwanda
As in all cases of mass violence, and in the case of the genocide against the Tutsi in
Rwanda’s case specifically, there is always the question of what conditions enabled the
humanitarian disaster. While the previous sections discussed the social-historical context for
division, it only touched upon the issues of hate speech and propaganda. In this sense, Ellul
(1973) outlines that “propaganda is a set of methods employed by an organized group that
wants to bring about the active or passive participation in its actions of a mass of individuals,
psychologically unified through psychological manipulations and incorporated in an
organization” (p. 61).
Further detail on the nexus between politics, power, and propaganda is offered by
Dojčinović (2012) arguing a clear nexus between politics, power and propaganda where there
is always a struggle to preserve power, and that programs of political propaganda are highly
strategic in nature based upon specific and intended responses that emerge in the target
audience. One of the most powerful explanations of propaganda, however, is from Harold
Lasswell (1927) in Propaganda Technique in the World War, where he discusses the
complicated nature and context, as well as the scale on which it can be effective. He posits
that:
Propaganda is one of the most powerful instrumentalities in the modern world. It has
arisen to its present eminence in response to a complex of changed circumstances
which have altered the nature of society.... A newer and subtler instrument must weld
thousands and even millions of human beings into one amalgamated mass of hate and
will and hope. (pp. 220-221)
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In terms of how propaganda techniques can harness such a volume of human beings
into this shared and intentionally constructed state of being (hate, will, and hope), Jowett and
O’Donnell (2019) explain that in order for propaganda to be at its most effective, the socialhistorical perspective is crucial, and that the flow of propaganda travels through a network
system “originating with an institution and ending with the possibility of response from the
public or a target audience within the public” (Jowett & O’Donnell, 2019, p. 321). It is where
there is a clear social-historical perspective which may be harnessed and molded to fit the
objectives of the propagandist that there can be a framed justification created by those in
power within the institution where the propaganda originated and the network system’s
inception begins.
The success of the propaganda in Rwanda’s case relied upon the three areas,
identified by Lasswell above, of hate, will, and hope being nurtured within the target Hutu
population. Through the process of dehumanization of the out-group (the Tutsi) as discussed
by Scull, Mbonyingabo, and Kotb (2016), it became easier to desensitize the Hutu allowing
them to act in an objectively cruel and extreme fashion. The concept of cruelty was removed
from the psyche of ordinary people in favor of efficiency and speed, allowing for the most
brutal methods of killing with machetes, clubs, and other barbaric but effective means.
On how propaganda can be constructed in order to bring about such extreme reactions and
achieve mass buy-in from a population, O’Shaughnessy (2004) argues that:
The art of propaganda lies in changing perspectives, and to change perspectives we
have to alter interpretation, to interpret the emotion-arousing situation in a different
way so people reassess its significance… This process is in its fundamentals
emotional, not… some sequence of logical inference, but of emotional argument with
the aim of persuading the audience to share a perspective or conjure up a certain
experience. (p. 44)
In Rwanda, this pattern is shown through the repeated themes of Hutu power and revolution
from oppression, while simultaneously characterising the Tutsi as being oppressors,
untrustworthy, and foreign invaders. The Rwandan state under Habyarimana knew that there
was emotional ill-feeling in this regard going back to the previously discussed colonial
periods in Rwanda’s history.
With the whole spectrum of media as possible mechanisms for conveying propaganda
by the state, both political speeches and radio broadcasts became the weapons of choice, with
written propaganda of secondary importance, in Rwanda. This may be in part because of the
power of the spoken word to convey emotions, the crucial element described by
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O’Shaughnessy above. In terms of Rwandan society, this was an especially obvious choice as
highlighted by many who have written on the subject. Baisley (2014) explains that “violence
appeared to increase as radio stations broadcast hate propaganda, more so than when
periodicals and magazines published similar propaganda” (p. 39). While Baisley is referring
specifically to radio stations, the fundamental argument is that the spoken word, with its
added linguistic effects, may have a more powerful propagandistic effect than the written
word alone. Indeed, contextualizing the issue further in terms of Rwanda, Baisley explains
that “the oral tradition remained strong, illiteracy was widespread, few Rwandans had foreign
language skills, and there was a dearth of alternative sources of information about
government” (p. 39). All of this strengthens the suggestion that in the Rwandan context,
indeed it is likely that speech in whichever form would have been the most powerful means
by which propaganda could be most effectively conveyed.
On the nature of the information that would then be publicly conveyed to the mass
Rwandan population, des Forges (1999) explains, using the example of the RTLM radio
station, that even media that appeared to be private, upon deeper investigation would prove to
be controlled by the state asserting that “the ostensibly private station used equipment
belonging to various government ministries” (p. 59). Effectively, the centralized power of the
Rwandan State was such that it had the ability to control all publicly spoken information,
whether through official speeches or broadcast media.
Can propaganda be regarded as causal related to subsequent violence?
Not all commentators agree that propaganda has a causal effect on any violence that
follows. For example, Slocum-Bradley (2008) argues that:
Any statement can be made about a person’s or group’s “intentions,” “desires,”
“wants” or “goals,” but none can be verified. Hence, explanations that (merely) claim
to reveal purported “motives” fail to illuminate the mechanisms of meaning
construction and thus provide no scientific value. (p. 210)
However, this is a position that ignores a number of other accepted practices that allow clear
inference to motivation and intention. For example, in terms of many legal systems around
the world, an accepted means of establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt is a large
combination of circumstantial evidence. The judge in the case of Chan Chweng Kong v.
Public Prosecutor (1962) explains:
In cases like this where the evidence is wholly circumstantial what has to be
considered is not only the strength of each individual strand of evidence but also the
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combined strength of each individual strand when twisted together to make a rope.
The real question is: Is that rope strong enough to hang the prisoner? (pp. 307)
This metaphorical concept is universally used as part of legal education where future legal
practitioners are taught that no piece of evidence should be viewed in isolation when a case is
being constructed; rather it is the totality of evidence that can render a particular
interpretation or inference irrebuttable in nature.
Slocum-Bradley (2008) further presents an underdeveloped case seeking to negate the
possibility of speech causing any resulting action, arguing that:
While an illocution may “incite” or “encourage” (social force) a particular action, it
can never “cause” it… One social force may make another appropriate… However,
one social force does not “cause” another... Someone “encouraged” to kill another
person can refuse. Thus, an understanding of the normative context generated should
be taken neither as a stamp of approval, nor as a suggestion that other options were
not available to actors. (pp. 211-212)
Again, the argument presented ignores relevant context. While the premise might be arguable
in a vacuum where an individual makes a choice free of any social-historical context, to try
and maintain such a stance in the context of any mass atrocity driven by propaganda would
deny the evidence of the effects of propaganda researched and published throughout the 20th
and 21st centuries. In these cases, it is clear that a state power-driven narrative is created that
contains only one singular normative set of values or approaches that can be applied by the
target group, and that there is no feasible alternative. There is another problem in this same
section where Slocum-Bradley presents causation under a single interpretation. In legal terms
however, causation is normally broken into causa causans (the primary cause, or the last link
to the result), and causa sine qua non (an act without which the end result would have been
unlikely to occur). So although an act of hate speech or propaganda may not be regarded as
causal in terms of the causa causans, it most certainly can be regarded as a causa sine qua
non. Indeed, as explained by Cocks (2019):
As you study historical events, you will discover that things do not simply “happen”
without reason. Historical events are caused by things that occurred before them.
Also, historical events create changes that have consequences long after the event is
over… Every historical event occurred because of a series of events that happened
beforehand. Things that lead to another event are called “causes.” Some causes
occurred immediately before the event began, while others existed for several years
before they caused the event. Causes that occurred only a few hours, days or weeks
9

before the event are called “short-term causes.” Causes that existed for years, decades
or centuries before the event are called “long term causes.”
Ultimately, Cocks presents a strong argument that causation may be interpreted as being on a
scale ranging from direct/short-term to indirect/long-term, with any actions or events on that
scale being causal to some extent.
As Slocum-Bradley’s (2008) analysis continues, the author then presents a detailed set
of positioning analyses related to RTLM discourse, the transcripts of which are sourced
directly from the ICTR. She logically sets out how meaning systems are constructed through
storylines and positioning, and how that positioning results in legitimization and consequence
stemming from the discourse in question. However, in her conclusions a further fundamental
flaw emerges where she argues that:
Thus, to eradicate the Tutsis, according to the meaning system constructed by the
RTLM journalists, was not only legitimate but the “logical” thing to do. How can the
logic inherent to a particular meaning system be countered? One can propose an
alternative metaphor: Instead of “impurities,” a minority can be an “enrichment” to
society. Because an enrichment is something to be treasured and nurtured, the logic of
the metaphor suggests a fundamentally different alternative for (normatively)
appropriate action. While a meaning system cannot be evaluated for its truth-value
(e.g., there is no “real” storyline), it can be evaluated according to the possibilities for
action that it makes viable. (p. 224)
The problem with this analysis is that the situation Slocum-Bradley discusses relies upon a
non-existent reality that in all contexts are equal opportunities for alternative positioning, and
for opposing viewpoints to gain a foothold in order to contribute to a meaning system. The
problem in Rwanda’s case was that the totality of centralized power, including power over all
methods of public discourse resulted in there being only one meaning system communicated,
one overarching storyline, and only one normatively appropriate action: the destruction of the
Tutsi population. This goes beyond broadcast and print media, into all public political speech.
The relationship between speech and action therefore, is clearly causal in nature.
In further strengthening this point, Dojčinović (2012) argues that when used
effectively, propaganda is not simply a precursor to mass violence:
Political parties, military and paramilitary movements are, for instance, all organized
groups. The aspect of “psychological manipulation” of their activities relates to the
methods (intentionally) employed with the purpose of bringing people individually, or
as groups, to agree on a stipulated action. (p. 31)
10

And then at the ICTR, through the Nahimana judgment set out that “the ethnic hatred that
permeates Kangura had the effect of poison, as evidenced by the testimony of the witness”
(ICTR, 2003, para. 243). Again, the words used by the court render the position of
propaganda as being not simply prior incitement, rather a weapon that plays an active role in
the conflict itself.
On Speeches Specifically
Louis (2008), when conducting conflict analysis explains the importance of speeches
(and other combined oral-physical means of communicating ideas), outlining that body
language including punches, holding hands, as well as symbolism including clothing worn,
combine with the speech itself in order to convey messages and the specific interpretation
those words are intended to carry. Neither written word nor radio transmission can convey
these oral-physical symbols, and so public speeches are necessary for communication to the
masses. Further on the subject of inflammatory speeches, Dojčinović (2012) outlines the
significance of such public speeches, explaining that:
The content of the messages along with the conditions and circumstances of their
utterance… play a key role in determining whether the message is actionable… Based
on their status and authority, it can be reasonably suggested that public speakers,
leaders and the intellectual elite, have the knowledge and awareness of the possible
consequences of their utterances. While the leaders institutionally authorized by law
have both legal authority and status, the position of public intellectuals, or other
individual citizens for that matter, is commonly based on a status attributed to them
by a general social consensus… Patriotic, nationalistic or xenophobic speeches… may
lead to a series of incidents or eventually armed conflicts potentially directly resulting
in the commission of war crimes. As a matter of fact, all propagandists act with the
assumption of “foreseeable consequences.” That is the very reason why they act. (pp.
26-27)
Considering this perspective then, it can be reasonably argued that the more powerful the
speaker, and the more legitimate that power is as viewed by the audience, the greater the
likelihood that members of that audience would deem the issues raised as being actionable. It
would be difficult to find a more powerful figure in this sense than the president of the
country itself. On the subject of intellectuals, Schabas (2000) then solidifies the importance
of Leon Mugesera’s speech, to follow in more detail later, when he explains that:
There is no magic threshold past which ethnically motivated killing becomes
genocide. The real test lies in the intent of the perpetrator. Mugesera's speech had
11

brought us face to face with a genocidal intent. His call for destruction of Rwanda's
Tutsi population was the decisive new element…Mugesera himself did not commit
genocide, although his speech sparked a series of atrocities directed against Tutsi in
the Gisenyi region of the country…The road to genocide in Rwanda was paved with
hate speech. (p. 144)
So it is clear that the nature of speeches in Rwanda leading up to the genocide in 1994 may
be an important factor in the violence that occurred, and further analysis of those speeches is
warranted in order to establish if such conclusions can indeed be drawn.
Theoretical Framework
When considering the case of Rwanda and President Habyarimana’s ability to control
the actions of the Interahamwe (the militant youth wing of the MRND) and the wider Hutu
population to the point that they would kill and consider this to be little more than work, this
fits into Weber’s (1978) and Dahl’s (1957) models of power where Habyarimana is
exercising power over his citizens, both Interahamwe or the wider Hutu population, in the
form of “A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something B would not
otherwise do” (Dahl, 1957, pp. 202-203).
Where Foucault views that power and knowledge are inseparable, with the repeated
linking of each in his work, it should be clear that those able to create and manipulate
knowledge are the same people that ultimately hold power. In discussing Foucault, Sheridan
(1980) explains that:
No body of knowledge can be formed without a system of communications, records,
accumulation and displacement which is in itself a form of power and which is linked,
in its existence and functioning, to the other forms of power. Conversely, no power
can be exercised without the extraction, appropriation, distribution or retention of
knowledge. (p. 283)
In Rwanda with divisions in formal education whereby Tutsi and Hutu children were
physically separated and given different learning experiences, where top-down knowledge
was fed to the population via the state-sponsored RTLM radio station and through
publications such as Kangura, nearly all public discourse from childhood into adulthood from
the early 1970s until 1994 included anti-Tutsi sentiment and propaganda. This totalitarian
power over knowledge is a clear example of Foucault’s position on the inextricability of each
from the other, at least in the Rwandan context.
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Foucault (1978) further discusses in The History of Sexuality the importance of
discourse to power. However he emphasizes that the ability to control public discourse can be
used either for the retention of existing power, or for the purposes of resistance, noting:
A discourse can be both an instrument and an effect of power, but also a hindrance, a
stumbling point of resistance and a starting point for an opposing strategy. Discourse
transmits and produces power; it reinforces it, but also undermines and exposes it,
renders it fragile and makes it possible to thwart. (pp. 100-101)
In the context of Rwanda, although identity-based conflict had previously emerged
through violent episodes in the 1950s and 1960s, tensions escalated greatly from 1973
throughout the two decades of Habyarimana’s leadership. The centralized power-knowledgediscourse held by the MRND government, and the lack of any foothold into this discourse by
the eventual target victim group, can be aligned to the combined theoretical outlooks of
Weber, Dahl, and Foucault. In Rwanda, the one-sided power-knowledge-discourse was used
by the powerful, autocratic state through public speaking and propaganda, designed in such a
way that major conflict was the only possible outcome. This eventually arrived in the form of
the genocide against the Tutsi in 1994.
Methodology
Discourse Analysis and Critical Discourse Analysis
On analysis of the above theoretical framework, the choice and justification of
discourse analysis (DA) as a methodological tool should be clearly understood. Discourse
analysis is a commonly used to analyze political speech. As highlighted by Boodhoo and
Purmessur (2009), where the authors discuss DA in particular, spoken discourse is the most
common method employed by politicians to harness a wide audience as it is more effective in
capturing and retaining the attention of a wide audience than written text alone. The authors
use the phrase “political marketing” (p. 4), which is a striking phrase illustrating that the
concepts of consumer buy-in for a product and populace buy-in to a political ideology may
not be dramatically different.
In further refining the appropriate methodologies that may be applied to the topic at
hand, the most readily apparent and natural fit is to embark on a critical discourse analysis
(CDA). As explained by van Dijk (1995, pp.17-18) CDA does not intend to focus on a
theoretical paradigm, although such paradigms may be included. Rather it aims to focus on a
societal problem or issue whereby power and inequality are either tackled or reinforced
depending on the discourse adopted. Within CDA it is common to consider linked methods of
communication including spoken and written word, body language and gestures, as well as
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alternative media such as sound and visual aids. Perhaps the most important facet of CDA is
again highlighted by van Dijk (1995) where he explains that:
CDA specifically focuses on the strategies of manipulation, legitimation, the
manufacture of consent and other discursive ways to influence the minds (and
indirectly the actions) of people in the interests of the powerful. This attempt to
uncover the discursive means of mental control and social influence implies a critical
and oppositional stance, against the powerful and the elites and especially those who
abuse their power. (p.18)
The need for such a methodology is simple, in that it is not contentious to say that
political discourse is at least partially constructed to influence the way that society views
particular issues, and shape or alter the mind-set of the viewer or listener. Possibly more
contentious but accepted by the author is that there are often covert, ulterior, or even
indoctrinating hidden or subliminal messages conveyed within political discourse that are
deliberately constructed in this way to “retreat into mystification and impersonality” (Kress,
1988, p. 57) and effectively preclude any possibility of direct challenge on accountability
when the subliminal instruction or passive approval are then enacted.
In practice then, when conducting the CDA, each level of discourse will be analysed,
from the social conditions that have led to the discourse being created and how those might
validate the given interpretation; then moving on to the process (if this can be ascertained or
inferred) by which the discourse was constructed, i.e. if the discourse was pre-planned or
spontaneous, and how this might aid interpretation; and finally the discourse itself, which will
be critically analysed in light of the first two levels. As relates to the discourse itself, an
interpretation of how the speaker’s underlying intention might be discerned by considering
the interaction surrounding the discourse, and finally a critical explanation concluded by
drawing links between the discourse, interaction, and wider social conditions. This structure
of analysis should then close the circle whereby, as highlighted by van Dijk (1995),
politicians may start a process by either explicitly or implicitly attributing major societal
problems to a particular (often minority voting) group, which then has the effect of
influencing the mindset of another (usually majority voting) group. That majority group can
then be observed to act in accordance with that influence and blame the targeted minority
group, which has the effect of legitimizing policy and action that may lead to further
prejudice and marginalization, and effectively ending the process with the same party from
which it originated, having had the desired effect.
The Importance of Context
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The importance of “real” context for the comparative elements of this paper is crucial.
In order to convey the realities of unchallenged manipulation and legitimation, and of the
resulting human suffering, elements of ethnography will be utilised. These will be minor and
extend only to one of the potential ethnographic foci as identified by Atkinson and
Hammersley (1998) when the authors categorize combined characteristics that may be
classed as ethnographic in nature, this being “narrative description as the product of analysis
that includes an unequivocal acknowledgement of interpretation of the significance and
purpose of human behavior” (p. 110). In practice, this ethnographic element comprises a brief
narrative description at the outset, of the author’s first-hand account of being present in
spaces where genocidal acts had taken place in Rwanda. Many of those spaces have been
preserved as they were found at the conclusion of the genocide and are open to the public
having been established as memorial sites to the victims of those killed at the hands of
perpetrators.
Underpinning Data
In collecting data to carry out a systematic CDA and indeed if carrying out any study
involving linguistics, in order to achieve the highest quality and most reliable results it is
important that either the individual is present at the event or has access to a complete
transcript of the speech/conversation in question. While this is difficult in the context of a
retrospective analysis, the nature of public speeches and events when there is clear dialogue
between the speaker and their audience becomes appropriate for the application of CDA
when transcripts of such events exist.
After a careful search, a fully transcribed event from November 15, 1992, admitted as
an exhibit during the ICTR case against Karemera and Ngirumpatse was sourced, where
President Habyarimana was carrying out a speech at a rally for the ruling MRND party with
the subject matter including allegations of hate crimes that had been committed against Tutsi
civilians by Hutu extremists. At the event, Habyarimana invited comment and gave response
on several occasions, creating the conditions appropriate for CDA. As courtroom evidence,
the accuracy of transcription will have been professionally verified.
In further justification of the use of such public speeches, Verwimp (2004) has argued
strongly in the context explicitly related to speeches held in Rwanda by President
Habyarimana that:
These speeches, contrary to those he made abroad, are directed at the Rwandan
population and, as such, reveal the way the dictator saw his country, its population
and his own task as leader. These speeches should not be considered mere rhetoric. I
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will show that Habyarimana actually implemented the policies that he advocated in
his speeches… It will be demonstrated that his ideology served as a legitimation for
the policies he advocated and especially for his personal hold onto power. (p. 2)
With few such affirmed transcripts of Habyarimana’s discourse available, and on
further searching, another transcript emerged that had been professionally translated on
commission of the Government of Canada by Thomas Kamanzi, Professor of Linguistics for
the Institute of Rwandan Studies at the Institute for Scientific and Technological Research
(IRST) in Rwanda, as part of a Canadian Supreme Court hearing into the status of Leon
Mugesera, a former MRND vice chairman, who had fled to Canada in 1993 claiming refugee
status. Ultimately the Supreme Court judged that Mugesera’s status as a refugee would be
revoked and that he would be extradited to Rwanda to face trial. Similar to the Habyarimana
speech, Mugesera had been speaking at an MRND party event, only a matter of days after
Habyarimana’s own discourse. This is useful, as the comparability of the discourse and
content from another speech by a different State actor in close proximity to Habyarimana’s
prior speech has the potential to strengthen the arguments surrounding the centralization of
power-knowledge and its potentially calamitous real-life consequences when there is no
foothold for alternative discourse to emerge and be considered.
As a tool to carry out the CDA then, an amended version of Wodak’s (2001)
categorization model has been compiled, with Wodak’s existing strategies of
referential/nomination; predication; argumentation; perspectivation, framing or discourse
representation; and intensification, mitigation, mystification. The amendment comes with a
further identified strategy of deflection, clearly repeated within speeches. This is a fully
original element not included in any previously published discourse analysis examined on the
subject.
In terms of the speech of President Juvénal Habyarimana at an MRND meeting held
in Ruhengeri, Rwanda on November 15, 1992, the key strategic themes of the speech that
emerged from the analysis included self-presentation, false equivalence, negative “other”
presentation, legitimation of extremist factions, and de-legitimation of the “other” group as
excerpted in Table 1. Similarly, in the speech of Leon Mugesera a week later at another
MRND conference held in Kabaya, Rwanda on November 22, 1992, the key strategic themes
that emerged from the analysis included self-presentation, negative “other” presentation,
legitimation of extremist factions, and de-legitimation of the “other” group that had been
present in the Habyarimana speech a few days beforehand excerpted in Table 2.

16

TABLE 1. Speech of President Juvénal Habyarimana, MRND Meeting, Ruhengeri,
Rwanda, November 15, 1992
Strategies

Objective

Devices

Examples from Speech

Perspectivation,
Framing or
Discourse
Representation

Expressing
personal
involvement,
situating the
speaker’s point
of view

Reporting,
description,
narration or
quotation of
events or
utterances

“We firmly sustain the security”
“We wish firmly that the peace comes
back in our country”
“It is the reason for which we sustain
the negotiations in progress in
Arusha.”
“I, personally, in the name of the
MRND, I declare the every time that
the MRND party sustains the
negotiations”

TABLE 2. Speech of Leon Mugesera, MRND Conference, Kabaya, Rwanda, November
22, 1992
Strategies

Objective

Devices

Examples from Speech

Argumentation

Justification
of attributed
positive or
negative
labels

Topoi used to
justify
political
inclusion or
exclusion,
discrimination
or preferential
treatment

“I tell you that the Gospel has changed in
our movement”
“Tell me, if you as a man, a mother or
father”
“our movement is also a movement for
peace”
“Some have quoted the following
saying: ‘Those who seek peace always
make ready for war’”
“Tell me, dear parents gathered here”
“now she is attacking teachers!”
“these teachers must continue to educate
our children”
“we cannot let ourselves be invaded: this
is Forbidden”
“they come back armed with guns on
behalf of the ‘Inyenzis’”
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“we will never agree to die because the
law refuses to act”
“even the others who pass for Christians
were placed on one side. When an
MRND member showed his card, he was
immediately shot”
“I know you are men, you are young
women, fathers and mothers of families,
who will not allow yourselves to be
invaded, who will reject contempt.”
Analysis and Discussion
On considering the key principles that underpin CDA, that discourse is often
controlled by the powerful and the elite, and often adopts strategies of manipulation,
legitimation, and mystification. The analysis conducted discovered repeated trends in both
1992 speeches conducted by President Habyarimana and Leon Mugesera. There were clear
examples of comparable discourse included constructed in such a way that it sought to deflect
the specific controversial topic under discussion to an unrelated area that positioned either the
speaker themselves or the group responsible for the violence in question in a more positive
light. In a number of these cases this deflection attempts to present a false equivalence, while
refusing to acknowledge blame for groups responsible for violent incidents. The discourse
seeks also to raise the social standing of the perpetrator group, while simultaneously
damaging the social standing and reputation of the victim group by referring to different
positive and negative aspects of each group’s behavior. In some ways this can be linked to
the predication strategies but is distinct enough as a strategy to be classified in its own right.
Hence, the deflection category was added to the pre-existing list of strategies that had been
identified by Wodak (2001) in her original model.
In terms of the referential/nomination and predication strategies that aim to construct
in-groups and out-groups as well as create false equivalence through this process, in addition
to the construction of positive or negative traits as highlighted above, there are several further
examples outlined. These strategies, in addition to the creation of false equivalence, then
further seek to absolve a large proportion of the aggressor group of blame and paint them as
scapegoats. This is clear when analyzing President Habyarimana’s explicit construction of the
Interahamwe as scapegoats for the mass killings that they had in fact been responsible for
during the 1990-1992 period (later shown to have been a series of tests of impunity in the
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lead up to the eventual 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi). On examination of Mugesera’s
speech, he moves beyond the more subtle tactics adopted by Habyarimana and leaves no such
room for doubt by making numerous references to the RPF and wider Tutsi population as
being inzenzi (cockroaches), while encouraging those listening to replace the former
reference to inkotanyi (tough fighters) with the clearly dehumanising former terminology. On
the other hand, Mugesera in referring to MRND members and the Hutu population
consistently refers to them using familial terms such as brothers, family, and the simple
collective we, which has the effect of creating a clear division between us and them for the
listener; a simple form of othering.
Moving on to the argumentation strategies adopted, Habyarimana’s discourse appears
to use topoi to justify political inclusion and exclusion as well as either preferential or
discriminatory behaviour applied respectively to the in and out groups. Similar topoi of
patriotism and nationalism, law and order, peace and security, and family and childhood are
evidenced in order to legitimize the aggressor group and justify demonization of the victim
group. Similarly, in Mugesera’s speech there are further references to peace, family and
childhood, as well as repeated use of both religion and the fear of invasion by a violent enemy
group. This would seem to be a clear and planned strategy with many correlating topoi and
parallels from each of the two speeches, and a possible indication of deliberate abuse of
power-knowledge through public discourse intended to lead to conflict.
Looking to perspectivation, framing and representation by the speaker related to the
discourse, the circumstances and narrative are framed in such a way as to clearly situate
Habyarimana’s personal stance on the violent actions in question and both the victim and
aggressor groups. President Habyarimana represents the aggressor group as being either
wholly innocent or with explicit justification for their actions, while simultaneously seeking
to invalidate or minimize the victimhood of those against whom the violence in question was
committed. President Habyarimana sets out his perspective that the MRND and Interahamwe
(the aggressor group) are the ones maintaining peace and security, carrying the clear
implication that the victim group are the ones responsible for the violent actions to which
they are subjected. Once again, Mugesera takes these same concepts and amplifies them
beyond doubt, moving from implicit to explicit. On multiple occasions he aligns his opinion
with fact, blurring the boundaries. He continually refers directly to the truthfulness of his
statements, and his speech culminates in the personal, direct stance and threat that the Tutsi
population in general are not naturally Rwandan; that they are Ethiopian; and that they will
be sent back to Ethiopia through being thrown in the Nyabarongo River. With this statement
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he moves beyond doubt that in his opinion the enemy were not simply the previously noted
“invading army,” but all of the ordinary Tutsi civilians living in Rwanda.
On analyzing the strategies of mystification in the discourse, there are clear
comparisons and similarities. President Habyarimana seeks to mystify the culpability of the
aggressor group by refusing to label mass killings, describing them as disturbances, then
calling the investigation into question and highlighting an apparent lack of evidence when the
investigators are not present to answer the allegation. Habyarimana then refers to the
investigations themselves as pseudo in nature, further calling their legitimacy and
professionalism into question. Through his discourse, there is a clear and intentional
mystification of the murders themselves, as well as the circumstances under which the
murders in question had been carried out. For Mugesera, he seeks to diminish any notion of
RPF strength by describing those members of the Rwandan Armed Forces (FAR) who had
lost key strategic positions in the north of the country during the (at that point) two-year civil
war, weakened by low morale, this being the reason that territories had been lost. Further,
with an example of government forces robbing local shops in the north, Mugesera blurs the
concept of responsibility by tying the issue together with the RPF “descending” on the
region, thus seeking to absolve the state from responsibility to some extent.
Finally, there is the newly created deflection category. Here the objective of the
discourse is to avoid acknowledgement of a crisis and any blame or accountability related to
the questionable actions, as well as to deflect the direction of the discourse to another matter
altogether. President Habyarimana appears to raise and discuss controversial issues that have
the potential to reflect badly on him and the state should the discourse become too detailed,
and then deflect the conversation to avoid in-depth or critical discussion. Where negativity
might have been externally assigned to the aggressor group by investigators, Habyarimana
deflects by discussing the material issues of their looking attractive in their uniform/clothing
to bring a positive light. Then for no clear or apparent reason, Habyarimana deflects central
issues altogether by discussing the irrelevant (in the context of this particular speech) matter
of his own willingness to help refugee school children by personally paying for their school
materials. Discussion of both of these areas was used to deflect external negative perspectives
on the Interahamwe and state culpability for violence, redirecting the conversation with a
discourse that presented both the aggressor group, as well as himself personally, in a more
positive light. While there is less than this in Mugesera’s speech, he uses deflection in order
to paint both himself and President Habyarimana in a positive light, when discussing the
MRND flags he personally distributed and enjoyed seeing, and on describing Habyarimana as
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“invincible” while boasting about party members from rival political groups defecting to the
MRND, thus emphasising the ruling party’s popularity and the ruler’s power and strength.
As outlined in the justification for the use of CDA, it is crucial to consider the social
conditions in which the society subject to the discourse is set, and whether these conditions
serve to validate the analysis and conclusions drawn out of the discourse itself, then
discussing the nature of the discourse itself and any suggestion as to whether it may have
been either planned or spontaneous.
In Rwanda, and in hindsight, it is suitable to assert that the given analysis and
interpretation of discourse should be viewed as accurate and indicative of a wider powerknowledge-discourse strategy. When there have been multiple and objectively irrebuttable
accounts of a genocide taking place against the Tutsi less than eighteen months after the
analysed speeches; where journalists, academics and members of Habyarimana’s MRND
government have been convicted by an impartial tribunal for crimes fundamentally linked to
the demonization and dehumanization of the Tutsi population, it is clear that the social
conditions of the country at the time the speeches were made correlates with the analysis
presented throughout this article.
The planned or spontaneous nature of the discourse is somewhat more difficult to
conclude with certainty. Verwimp (2004) has tackled this issue previously, concluding:
Did Habyarimana write his speeches all by himself? This question remains open, but
he probably did not. According to my informants, at least three people helped him:
Ferdinand Nahimana, professor of history and leading intellectual of the regime;
Jeanne Charles, a Swiss professor and consultant to the president; and C. Mfusi, a
Rwandan journalist who later became a critic of the regime. (p. 2)
Importantly, Verwimp only refers to others having “helped,” the implication being that
Habyarimana was still the main creator of the discourse in question. As highlighted earlier in
this article, Verwimp makes it explicitly clear that the words spoken by Habyarimana in his
speeches tended to be reflected in his policies, strengthening the perspective that the
discourse is a reflection of the power he personally held.
For Mugesera on the other hand, through the many court documents surrounding his
own trial and prior hearings, there are no indications that anyone other than himself had been
involved in the construction of his speech, which was likely to have been in part planned and
spontaneous in form. Evidence of a degree of prior preparation can be argued given the
similarities noted throughout the critical discourse analysis between speeches.

21

Ultimately, the centralized power-knowledge-discourse relationship combining the
theories of Weber, Dahl and Foucault as outlined through the theoretical framework, is
confirmed in the Rwandan context at least through the analysis presented, when considering
that the propagandic content of the speeches contributed to the near destruction of the
targeted victim group, and the fact that the main perpetrators were not in fact trained
combatants, but ordinary citizens conditioned on a mass scale to hate and eventually kill.
Conclusion
In nearly every developed country around the world, freedom of expression is a
conditional right that can be interfered with or even removed for a large variety of reasons.
One of those typical reasons is to ensure that hate speech is never deemed legal and can be
treated as a criminal act by the state. People are free to think what they want, and hold
whatever ideology they like; however, they are not free to act on those ideologies with evil
intent or to incite others to join them. Under these circumstances it would be worth
considering the ideas raised by Karl Popper’s (1945) Paradox of Tolerance, often shortened
and taken out of context to say that unpopular opinions must be suppressed. In fact, Popper’s
full explanation is more detailed and nuanced than this overly simplified tagline:
Unlimited tolerance must lead to the disappearance of tolerance. If we extend
unlimited tolerance even to those who are intolerant, if we are not prepared to defend
a tolerant society against the onslaught of the intolerant, then the tolerant will be
destroyed, and tolerance with them….In this formulation, I do not imply, for instance,
that we should always suppress the utterance of intolerant philosophies; as long as we
can counter them by rational argument and keep them in check by public opinion,
suppression would certainly be unwise. But we should claim the right to suppress
them if necessary even by force; for it may easily turn out that they are not prepared
to meet us on the level of rational argument, but begin by denouncing all arguments;
they may forbid their followers to listen to rational argument, because it is deceptive,
and teach them to answer arguments by the use of their fists or pistols. We should
therefore claim, in the name of tolerance, the right not to tolerate the intolerant.
(chap.7, note 4, p. 581)
Popper’s words make sense when considering the full Rwandan context in both
historical and contemporary senses. When unjustifiable hatred and intolerance, and other
rhetoric based on fear of the other is espoused by the most powerful individuals in a country,
it should be no surprise when the ordinary person follows believing that their own previously
suppressed opinions and actions, can be repeated or acted upon in public without fear of
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repercussion. Popper explains that it should not always be necessary to suppress intolerant
philosophies where alternative discourse is permissible, and this aligns precisely with the set
theoretical framework Foucault argues: that discourse has the potential to assist with both
retention of and resistance to power when discourse is held in a society that is not under a
totalitarian rule and opposing discourse is not permitted. In these circumstances, it would
seem that all public discourse then seeks to strengthen power through the control of societal
knowledge, and to target and eradicate all threats to those discourse narratives.
It is in these totalitarian contexts that Popper’s paradox of tolerance becomes
particularly relevant, as when credible signs of intolerance emerge in societies, a key strategy
to combat this might involve laws and initiatives that highlight the need not to tolerate the
intolerant. In other words, to resist the attempt from the emerging totalitarian element of the
state to wield power in its efforts to dominate a discourse to the exclusion of competing
discourse, by lobbying for a clear policy to ban certain types of intolerant discourse being
held in public. This can be a controversial tactic as many citizens around the globe hold an
ideology of total freedom of expression as an express right, however those that have been
direct or indirect victims of hatred might hold a different view, whereby they accept that there
may be legitimacy in having at least some degree of legal protection from, in particular, hate
speech.
Indeed, several countries have laws prohibiting issues such as Holocaust denial. For
example: Austria, section 3h of the Verbotsgesetz 1947 National Socialism Prohibition law;
Belgium, Holocaust Denial Act; Czech Republic, 2001 Law Against Support and
Dissemination of Movements Oppressing Human Rights and Freedoms s261a, Germany, the
Volksverhetzung, otherwise referred to as the law of “incitement of the people”, s130
Incitement to Hatred, revised as recently as 2015; many others have laws banning hate speech
in general. In the Rwandan context it should not therefore be particularly surprising that there
are laws surrounding public discourse covering issues of genocide denial and ethnic identity,
given the grave consequences directly linked to the gross misuse of power in this regard
through the discourse of the previous totalitarian regime. Indeed, to express that this is
inappropriate could be argued to be somewhat hypocritical and ethnocentric in nature given
the comparable legislation that is widely accepted as necessary and proportionate in the
context of Holocaust denial.
This normalization of hatred evidenced through abuse of power and a totalitarian hold
on the power-knowledge-discourse relationship in many jurisdictions must be halted globally,
to prevent further mass outbreaks of violence similar to what happened in Rwanda in 1994. If
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not, then it is inevitable that the centralization of power in the wrong hands will continue to
lead to either escalation of conflict or further violence in a number of potentially vulnerable
jurisdictions.
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